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COMPARABLE WORTH: AN IMPERMISSIBLE
FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?*
Kingsley R. Browne**
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the general principle of "comparable worth" or "pay equity,"
the amount of compensation paid should be the same for employees per-
forming work requiring "comparable skill, effort and responsibility under
similar working conditions."' In a recent article, Paul Weiler wrote that
the issue of comparable worth has taken the place held by affirmative
action in the 1970s as the most controversial civil rights issue of the dec-
ade.2 While Professor Weiler's statement may be true, he and other com-
mentators have failed to recognize that most comparable worth systems,
properly understood, are simply a species of affirmative action.3
Although comparable worth is not necessarily a form of affirmative ac-
tion, many comparable worth plans are, because they establish sex pref-
* Copyright © 1989 by Kingsley R. Browne.
** Partner, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California; B.A., The George Washing-
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The Author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Erica B. Grubb, David L. Slate,
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also thanks Suzanne Pope for valuable research assistance.
1. Bellak, Comparable Worth. A Practitioner's View, 1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE
FOR THE 80's, 75, 75 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm'n ed. 1984).
Comparable worth has also been described as a "wage discrimination claim based on the
employer's use of different criteria in establishing the wage rates for male- and female-domi-
nated jobs." Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibil-
ity of Implementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 9 (1986); see also Brown, Bauman & Melnick,
Equal Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 127, 129 (1986) (" 'Comparable Worth' means that workers, regardless of their sex,
should earn equal pay for work of comparable value to their common employer.").
2. Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1728, 1728 (1986).
3. See Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1312, 1326, n.53 (1986) (arguing that both affirmative action and comparable worth are incon-
sistent with the principles of the civil-rights movement, but stating that "[c]omparable worth
should stand or fall as a political issue, to be decided in political forums, and with regard to the
changing social and economic position of women"); Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of
Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 IowA L. REv.
901, 941 (1985) (affirmative action now accepted by the body politic; "[tihe now and future
issue is comparable worth").
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erences by entitling only workers in female-dominated occupations to
wage increases based upon the "objective worth" of the occupation.
This Article suggests that comparable worth plans that condition
their benefits on the sex composition of the occupational group constitute
sex preferences that must meet the standards that have been established
for affirmative action programs in order to survive scrutiny under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.' Most of the debate over comparable worth has cen-
tered on whether a failure to pay wages in accordance with comparable
worth principles violates Title VII or the equal protection clause. 6 No
consideration has been given to whether the remedy for the assumed vio-
lation is consistent with these laws. In fact, few sex-conscious compara-
ble worth plans would satisfy affirmative action standards. It follows,
then, that even voluntary comparable worth plans that reflect a political
consensus or that are the product of an agreement between management
and labor may be impermissible under present law.
II. THE COMPARABLE WORTH DEBATE
A great deal has been written on comparable worth from both a
legal and a policy perspective,7 and it is not the purpose of this Article to
address all issues raised by the debate. However, a brief overview of
some of the arguments raised provides useful background.
Proponents of comparable worth suggest that jobs traditionally held
by females-such as nurse, teacher and clerical worker-tend to be un-
dervalued when compared to jobs traditionally held by males-such as
garbage collector and electrician-"in part because they are held mainly
by women."8 They cite job-evaluation studies9 that indicate equal levels
of skill, effort, and responsibility between typical male- and female-domi-
nated positions, such as electrician and nurse, and claim that the wage
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. See infra text accompanying note 7.
7. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" The-
ory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233 (1980); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job
Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979);
Weiler, supra note 2.
8. Excerpts from the National Academy of Sciences Study, "Women, Work, and Wages:
Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value," The Comparable Worth Issue, [Supp. 433] Lab. L, Rep.
(BNA) No. 935, at 120-21 (Nov. 7, 1981) [hereinafter Women, Work and Wages].
9. The Hay system, employed by Hay Associates, assigns a point value to jobs based on
four factors: (1) know-how; (2) problem solving; (3) accountability; and (4) working condi-
tions. See Rothchild, Overview of Pay Initiatives, 1974-1984, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE
FOR THE 80's 119, 124 (1984).
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differentials observed must be due to sex discrimination.10 They advo-
cate, for example, increasing the wages of nurses to equal those of
electricians.1 1
It is important to note that proponents of comparable worth do not
necessarily contend that an employer who hires both nurses and electri-
cians consciously undervalues the nurses' worth on the basis of sex. 12
Indeed, to the extent that an employer did so, it would be in violation of
Title VII Rather, comparable worth proponents argue either that reli-
ance on the market to set wage levels constitutes a practice with a "dispa-
rate impact" under Title VII, 4 which is invalid even in the absence of a
showing of intentional discrimination," or that reliance on the market
constitutes "disparate treatment" because the market is itself
discriminatory.
1 6
Opponents of comparable worth maintain that comparable worth
claims cannot be brought as disparate-impact claims under Title VII, be-
cause reliance on the market is a "factor other than sex," which is a
defense under the Equal Pay Act17 applicable to actions claiming dis-
criminatory compensation under Title VII They further argue that the
10. Dowd, The Metamorphosis of Comparable Worth, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 833, 838
(1986) ("the gist of a comparable worth claim is that discrimination exists when workers in a
job classification dominated by one sex are paid less than workers in a classification dominated
by the opposite sex, where both job classifications are of equal value or worth to the employer,
or the underpaid classification is of greater value to the employer").
Application of comparable worth principles is not necessarily limited to those instances
where jobs are rated equally. Some advocates of comparable worth employ a multiple-regres-
sion model. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 7, at 25 1-53. Under the multiple-regres-
sion model, all variables that the investigator deems relevant to compensation are analyzed.
Then, after an analysis of all these variables, any differences in compensation are deemed to be
a function of sex. See id.
11. See, e.g., Levit & Mahoney, The Future of Comparable Worth Theory, 56 U. COLO. L.
REv. 99, 100 (1984).
12. Id.
13. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
14. Note, Comparable Worth. The Next Step Toward Pay Equity Under Title VII, 62 DEN.
U.L. REv. 417, 436-42 (1985).
15. Under Title VII, employer practices may be challenged on two grounds. First, an
action taken with the intent to discriminate may be challenged under the disparate-treatment
theory. Second, an action taken with no intent to discriminate may be challenged under the
disparate-impact theory if it has an adverse effect on a particular group. Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2783-84 (1988). A practice with a disparate impact may
be sustained only if it is supported by "business necessity" or a "legitimate business" reason.
Id. at 2790.
16. See Clauss, supra note 1, at 59-66.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1983).
18. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977), for examples of cases
successfully invoking reliance on the market as a defense to compensation "disparities" under
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market does not constitute the kind of specific employment practice that
can be examined under the disparate-impact analysis. 9 Because it is pos-
sible to hire nurses for lower wages than electricians, an employer who
sets wages consistent with the market price should not be considered to
be engaging in sex discrimination.
Opponents of comparable worth also reject the argument that all
unexplained differences between wages of male- and female-dominated
positions can be attributed to sex discrimination.20 Attributing all unex-
plained differences in wages to sex discrimination is merely an attempt to
shift the burden of proof to the employer, who then must prove that
differences were not caused by discrimination.2 1 However, two facts
must be demonstrated to warrant the conclusion that unexplained dis-
parities are a function of sex discrimination. First, all major relevant
variables contributing to the disparity must have been considered.22
Title VII. See also Gunther, 452 U.S. 161. The Equal Pay Act contains four affirmative de-
fenses, one of which is that the challenged disparity is a result of a "factor other than sex." Id.
at 167 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1983)). In Gunther, the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Pay Act defenses are applicable in Title VII actions. Id. at 168-71.
19. See American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985).
20. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 7, at 253 ("The most that multiple-regression
analyses can tell us is that some of the gross earnings differences between the sexes are ac-
counted for legitimately, while the remainder must result from unmeasured legitimate sources,
and/or job separation, and/or from wage discrimination.").
21. See id. at 246 (pointing out that where discrimination is presumed, the employer's
burden of proof will often be impossible to satisfy).
Some advocates of comparable worth acknowledge their desire to shift the burden of
proof. For example, one student Note has argued that "[p]erhaps part of the problem with the
advocates' position is that they have assumed the burden of proof in justifying their equal pay
concepts." Note, Comparable Worth and the Presumption of Equality: What Does "Justice"
Require?, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 837, 853 (1985). The Note presumes wage discrimination where
70% or more of the occupants of a job category are of one sex and where employees in that
category receive lower wages than employees occupying comparable job categories that have a
balanced sex composition or that are predominantly of the other sex. Id. at 838-40. The
employer then would have the heavy burden of showing valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for
the wage disparity, a burden that could not be satisfied by showing that the employer paid the
market rate. Given that the Note proceeds from the premise that women's wages have been
depressed because of an historic undervaluation of women's work, it is illogical to presume
discrimination in a case in which a predominantly male job category is underpaid.
See also Levit & Mahoney, supra note 11, at 116 ("Since courts require comparable worth
plaintiffs to raise much more than a mere inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie
case... we conclude that... the ultimate burden of persuasion should shift to the em-
ployer."); TREIMAN & CHENG, CALIFORNIA COMPARABLE WORTH TASK FORCE, MINORITY
REPORT 10 (1985) ("it is not unreasonable to say that if an employer can't demonstrate that a
pay differential correlated with the sex or race composition of jobs is actually due to some
legitimate difference between jobs, it is sex or race that is being paid for, which is discrimina-
tory and must be corrected").
22. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 7, at 251 n.85 (mathematical analysis "cannot
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Since assessment of relevance is subjective and speculative, it is difficult
to conclude that no variables were excluded from the analysis.23 Second,
and more critical, it must be demonstrated that the proper weight has
been assigned to each variable. The multiple-regression analysis24 relies
on the assignment of numerical values to each variable. For example, in
comparing the jobs of electrician and nurse, numerical values must be
assigned to "amount of responsibility" and "quality of working condi-
tions."25  It is one thing to claim that persons performing jobs requiring
comparable skill, effort, and responsibility under comparable working
conditions should be paid equally; it is quite another to determine which
jobs actually impose comparable demands.
Since, by definition, comparable jobs are not identical, some stan-
dard must exist by which comparability of jobs can be assessed. For ex-
ample, how does one compare the working conditions of a nurse to those
of a garbage collector, the necessary skills of an electrician to those of a
bookkeeper, or the effort required of an engineer to that required of a
distinguish the effects of discrimination from the effects of legitimate factors that it was not
possible to measure").
One commentator has questioned the existence of unexplained disparities that are not
based upon sex, but her reasoning is difficult to follow. See Clauss, supra note 1, at 55-56. She
argues: "Significantly, the opponents to comparable worth are unable to suggest what this
unidentified factor might be." Id. Aside from the obvious point that if opponents were able to
identify the factor it would no longer be an "unidentified factor," the author fails to deal with
the existence of within-sex disparities that exist even after controlling for job content. The
author does acknowledge that such disparities exist. Id. at 20. Nonetheless, she suggests that
the existence of non-sex-based factors that would explain between-sex disparities "is highly
unlikely and certainly too speculative to rebut the prima facie showing of disparate treatment
established by the regression analysis." Id. at 56.
23. For example, if the risk involved in a particular job is considered, much of the dispar-
ity that has been ascribed to sex disappears. Finn, The Earnings Gap and Economic Choices,
EQUAL PAY FOR UNEQUAL WORK 101, 110 (1984). Similarly, a long history of collective
bargaining may be correlated with higher wage rates. See Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage
Discrimination, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 99, 110-11 n.32 (1986). Blumrosen suggests that "the
contention that wages in many men's occupations are higher because of collective bargaining
often is another example of 'blaming the victim,"' since predominantly female occupations
such as teachers and nurses have been deprived of the opportunity to achieve higher wages
through collective bargaining. Id. rm. 31-32. She argues that predominantly female occupa-
tions "were among [those]... that, almost universally, were prohibited from striking on the
grounds that their work was so important to.society that a cessation of their services would be
unthinkable." Id. n.32.
This argument. is flawed for two reasons. First, the nurses and teachers who have been
forbidden from striking have largely been in the public sector, where there has traditionally
been a substantial limitation on the right to strike in all job categories. Second, occupations
such as police and firefighters have been under an equal, if not greater, restriction on the right
to strike, and these are clearly not female-dominated professions.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 10 and 20 for a discussion of the multiple-regres-
sion analysis.
25. See Clauss, supra note 1, at 38-39.
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high-school teacher?26 Assigning an objective score for a job analysis is
an extremely subjective process.2 7 For example, suppose that there are
two different jobs that are otherwise comparable in the required skill,
effort, responsibility, and working conditions, but one job requires signifi-
cant travel, while the other does not. The travel requirement makes
these two jobs significantly different in terms of working conditions, but
how will the travel requirement be assessed in the job evaluation?
Consider Employee A, who views the opportunity to travel in a job
as a positive factor. In a point-based system, where additional compensa-
tion must be paid to overcome objectionable or difficult working condi-
tions, Employee A's evaluation should reflect travel as a positive factor.
For Employee A, the job requiring travel would be lower paying than
jobs not requiring travel. On the other hand, Employee B may view the
same travel requirement negatively. Therefore, additional compensation
may be required to make up for what Employee B considers adverse
working conditions. Further complicating the issue under a comparable
worth analysis is the fact that whether a travel requirement is viewed
positively or negatively may be correlated with sex. For example, it may
be that most women, particularly women with families, would be less
willing to travel than most men, since for women with families travel
may interfere with domestic responsibilities to a greater extent than it
does for men. Therefore, the number of points assigned to this hypothet-
26. See Schwab, Using Job Evaluation to Obtain Pay Equity, 1 COMPARABLE WORTH:
ISSUE FOR THE 80's 83, 89 (1984) ("Different forms of job evaluation... yield different job
hierarchies .... Even within a single system, different evaluators score jobs differently."
(footnote omitted)); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 7, at 256 (criticizing the Hay system
because of its extreme subjectivity and pointing out that different job evaluation systems can
produce very different evaluations of the worth of a given job).
27. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 7, at 255 ("Job evaluation systems are basi-
cally methods for systematizing and recording subjective judgments, and at each stage in the
process-job analysis, job description, selection of compensable factors, weighting of compen-
sable factors, and the selection of the breadth of jobs to which a particular system will be
applied-the necessarily subjective judgments inevitably incorporate individual and societal
biases." (footnote omitted)).
See also H. AARON & C. LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY 28 (1986)
("Subjective evaluations enter at every step of the way: in determining what attributes to
include in the job evaluation, in setting the point weights for each attribute, in deciding how
many points each job should get for each attribute, and in calibrating the resulting point scores
with pay."). Even proponents of comparable worth acknowledge the inherent subjectivity of
job analysis. See, e.g., Women, Work and Wages, supra note 8, at 123, which stated that:
[T]here are no definitive tests of the "fairness" of the choice of compensable factors
and the relative weights given to them. The process is inherently judgmental and its
success in generating a wage structure that is deemed equitable depends on achieving
a consensus about factors and their weights among employers and employees.
Id. See also Levit & Mahoney, supra note 11, at 129 ("no bias-free evaluation technique
exists").
[Vol. 22:717
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ical job may vary depending upon whether travel is viewed positively,
which may not be a sex-independent variable.
Because of their subjectivity, job-evaluation studies may easily be
manipulated to reach any result. For example, after Ohio implemented a
"pay-for-points" system for public employees, the median hourly wage
for women remained thirteen percent less than that for men.2" The prob-
lem was not that jobs with the same rating were unequally compensated;
rather, the "problem" was that the work performed by men was rated
more valuable under the "objective" system employed by the state than
that performed by women.2 9 Although it would have been logical to ac-
cept these disparities as a result of objective differences in the jobs them-
selves, the conclusion was that the evaluation system itself needed to be
modified and updated in order to eradicate sex bias.30 Such a decision
seems inconsistent with a fundamental tenet of job evaluations-that
they "deal[ ] with jobs, not their incumbents."3 1 Under Ohio's approach,
the results of job evaluations are considered biased unless overall parity
in the level of compensation between males and females is accomplished.
Thus, the apparent goal is equality of result between the sexes, rather
than objectivity in compensation.3 2
Initially, proponents of comparable worth concentrated their efforts
on litigation, arguing that disparities in compensation between female-
and male-dominated jobs constituted sex discrimination under Title
VII.3 Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled
on the validity of comparable worth claims under Title VII, a series of
28. Ohio Will Spend $4.5 Million Annually to Eliminate Gender Bias from State Jobs,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at A-2 (Mar. 28, 1986) [hereinafter Ohio Gender Bias].
29. Id. Although some proponents of comparable worth have speculated that job evalu-
ators are biased against predominantly female jobs, experimental research does not support
that suggestion. Schwab, supra note 26, at 89.
30. Ohio Gender Bias, supra note 28.
31. H. AARON & C. LOUGY, supra note 27, at 26.
32. Apparently applying similar reasoning, New Jersey has rejected the use of the "work-
ing conditions" factor, probably because most job evaluation systems "award no points to
typical office work[,] because the office is defined as the standard of good working conditions."
Blumrosen, supra note 23, at 129 n.80. As a result, the office work factor is labelled "discrimi-
natory" to women, since most women work in offices. Id. Consequently, two people doing the
same work in New Jersey, one in an air-conditioned office and the other in an abattoir, would
be entitled to the same compensation.
33. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1986) (re-
jecting nurses' claim that state paid workers in predominantly male jobs are paid higher wages
not justified by any difference in relative worth); American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun.
Employees, 770 F.2d 1401 (state's decision to base compensation on the competitive market
rather than on theory of comparable worth did not create liability under disparate-impact
analysis); Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980) (rejecting comparable worth claim by nurses); Christensen, 563 F.2d 353 (re-
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lower court cases has rejected this attack.14 However, these judicial set-
backs for comparable worth should not be considered as portending the
end of the doctrine. Rather, the cases should be regarded as reinforcing a
trend away from litigation toward the adoption of legislation and collec-
tive-bargaining agreements incorporating the doctrine's principles .3  The
propriety of this developing trend is discussed in the remainder of this
Article.
III. COMPARABLE WORTH PLANS AS SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
Comparable worth plans generally fall into one of three categories:
(1) one-way plans;3 6 (2) two-way plans;
37 and (3) sex-neutral plans.38
One-way plans adjust wages only of undervalued female positions but not
undervalued male positions. A one-way plan has been adopted by the
legislature in Minnesota.39 Under the plan, the Commissioner of Em-
ployee Relations reports directly to the legislature every two years with a
list of female-dominated job classes that are paid less than the average
male-dominated classes with equal job-evaluation points.' One-way
plans have also been adopted in a number of collective-bargaining agree-
ments, such as a recent collective-bargaining agreement between Michi-
gan and the United Auto Workers.4 1 That agreement included a "pay
equity adjustment for employees in classifications that are 70% or more
jecting claim by female clerical employees that they were paid less than male physical plant
workers).
34. American Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 720; American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1403; Lemons,
620 F.2d at 230; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 357.
35. Gertner, Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational Strategies, 20
MICH. J.L. REF. 163, 176 (1986); Nelson, Book Review, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1199, 1204 (1985)
("Increasingly, advocates are looking to legislative rather than litigative strategies to achieve
pay equity."). For an overview of state and federal legislative activity, see Comment, Pay
Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of Comparable Worth into Employer Liability
Under Title VII, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 305, 355-85 (1987).
36. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 471.991-471.999 (West Supp. 1989).
37. IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.18 (West Supp. 1988).
38. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 240.190, 292.951-292.971 (Supp. 1988).
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West 1988).
40. Id.; see generally Rothchild, Pay Equity-The Minnesota Experience, 20 MICH. J.L.
REF. 209 (1986). Likewise, California has announced an intent "to establish a state policy of
setting salaries for female-dominated jobs on the basis of comparability of the value of the
work." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19827.2(a) (West Supp. 1988). A "one-way" plan was also pro-
posed in the Federal Pay Equity and Management Improvement Act of 1984, which defined
"discriminatory wage-setting practices" as the setting of wage rates paid for jobs held predomi-
nantly by female workers lower than those paid for comparable jobs held predominantly by
male workers. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(4) (1984).
41. Auto Workers Negotiate First Pact for State Employees in Michigan, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at A-3 (Jan. 29, 1986).
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female."'42
Two-way plans provide for an adjustment to both male-dominated
and female-dominated positions if a position dominated by one sex is
underpaid in comparison to comparable positions dominated by the
other sex. A two-way scheme has been adopted by the Iowa legislature.43
In Iowa, it is impermissible for a state employer to "discriminate in com-
pensation for work of comparable worth between jobs held predomi-
nantly by women and jobs held predominantly by men."'
Sex-neutral plans set salaries for jobs without regard to their sex
composition. Oregon has adopted such a plan by announcing its intent
"to achieve an equitable relationship between the comparability of the
value of work... performed by persons in state service and the compen-
sation and classification structure within the state system."4" Some sex-
neutral plans have been adopted as a means of furthering sexual equality,
while others may be motivated by a desire to implement a form of civil-
service reform.
Both one-way and two-way plans constitute sex-based classifica-
tions. They accord benefits depending solely upon the sex of the persons
in the particular job classifications. Under one-way plans, only those in
underpaid female-dominated occupations are entitled to wage increases.
Although both males and females in a given job are equally entitled to
the pay increase, it is the sex of the persons occupying the jobs and the
sex of the persons occupying comparable jobs that determine whether the
incumbents in the position receive an increase in salary.46
Under two-way plans, an employee is entitled to a pay increase only
42. Id. Chicago and Los Angeles have also entered into such arrangements. Los Angeles
and AFSCME Settle on Three-Year Pay Equity Pact, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-3
(May 10, 1985); Demise of Patronage, Comparable Worth Adjustments Featured in Chicago
Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 244, at A-i (Dec. 19, 1985).
43. IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.18 (West Supp. 1988).
44. Id.; see also id. § 602.1204 (state court administrator "shall not discriminate in the
employment or pay between employees on the basis of gender by paying wages to employees at
a rate less than the rate at which wages are paid to employees of the opposite gender for work
of comparable worth"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1101.4(A) (1988) (defining "discriminatory
wage-setting practices" as a "situation where the rates of pay for positions or position classifi-
cations that are dominated (composed 70% or more) by members of 1 sex are lower than the
rates of pay for positions or position classifications that are dominated (composed 70% or
more) by members of the opposite sex, although the work performed is of comparable value as
measured by the composite of the skill, effort, responsibilities, and working conditions nor-
mally required in the performance of the work.").
45. OR. REV. STAT. § 240.190(1) (1987).
46. A study by the State of Washington revealed that mental health specialists, 89% of
whom were men, were underpaid to the greatest extent. H. AARON & C. LOUGY, supra note
27, at 32 n.44. Similarly, three predominantly female jobs-librarian, nursing care consultant,
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if most of his or her colleagues are of one sex and most of the occupants
of a comparable classification are of the opposite sex.47 Under such
plans, underpaid male positions are also entitled to a pay increase. Just
as in one-way plans, the employee's own sex is generally not determina-
tive of the right to a wage adjustment, but the entitlement cannot be
determined without reference to sex.48
Generally, a sex classification is subject to scrutiny under anti-dis-
crimination laws if it is based upon an individual's sex or the sex of the
individual's associates. Numerous cases brought under the federal civil
rights laws have extended protection to whites who have been adversely
treated because of their association with blacks, or vice versa. An exam-
ple is Loving v. Virginia,49 where the Supreme Court of the United States
held Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws invalid, even though the laws ap-
plied equally to blacks and whites." The Court held that the laws were
invalid because "Virginia's miscegenation statutes rested solely upon dis-
tinctions drawn according to race."5" The Court rejected the state's ar-
gument that it was not discriminating since the law applied equally to
blacks and whites.52
Similarly, in Langford v. Texarkana,13 the Eighth Circuit held that
a public employer's discharge of a black male employee and a white fe-
male employee due to their non-work-related association violated the
equal protection clause.54 In DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co.," the
court held that a white employee's allegation that he was forced into
and school food services supervisor-were deemed overpaid. Id. A one-way system is per-
fectly content with such "inequities."
Compensation "inequities" within male- and female-dominated job classifications are
quite common. For example, the average wage for architects is less than that for engineers,
even though the educational and skill requirements for these two male-dominated positions are
very similar. Clauss, supra note 1, at 20. Similar disparities exist for female-dominated posi-
tions. Id. However, these "inequities," which may well be the result of the processes that
created disparities across sex classifications, would not be affected by a sex-conscious compara-
ble worth plan.
47. See supra notes 37 and 43-44 and accompanying text.
48. It could be argued that the same is true under the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits a
sex-based wage differential among workers performing the same work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1982). However, the Equal Pay Act's exception for "any factor other than sex," id., ensures
that the Act requires modification of wages only when the wage disparity is actually based
upon sex.
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 10.
53. 478 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1973).
54. Id. at 266-67.
55. 511 F.2d 306, aff'd on rehearing, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975).
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early retirement because he sold his house to a black family stated a
claim for relief under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.56 In all of these cases,
the critical element was that individuals were disadvantaged because they
associated with someone of a different race.
People who doubt that one-way and two-way comparable worth
plans establish sex classifications should consider whether they would
similarly conclude that no racial classification is established by an em-
ployer who grants a pay increase to all job categories in which 70 percent
of the employees are white or to all employees who happen to sit next to
white people. An employer who conditions entitlement to a salary ad-
justment under a comparable worth plan upon the sex of the incumbents
of a position has erected the same kind of classification.1
7
56. Id. at 312 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)).
57. There are cases raising questions about who has standing to raise a challenge to this
kind of classification. For example, in Patee v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir. 1986), the court held that males in predominantly female positions had no standing to
raise the claim that they were underpaid because they occupied predominantly female posi-
tions. Id. at 479. The court reasoned that the male plaintiffs were simply claiming that they
were being treated like women, rather than being treated adversely because they were men. Id.
at 478; Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (male plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge discriminatory employment practices against women). But cf
Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (male employees
had standing in Title VII action against employer who closed plant allegedly due to sex dis-
crimination against female employees); EEOC v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Freight, Inc., 659 F.2d 690,
692 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (nonminority may sue based upon discrimination against minority
members where personal right to work in an environment unafected by racial discrimination
is asserted).
Ironically, Patee, 803 F.2d at 478, relied on Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972), which took a broad view of standing in holding that the standing provision of
the Fair Housing Act (which is identical to that of Title VII) demonstrates "congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." Id.
at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)). In Traf-
ficante, the Court ruled that white tenants had standing under the Fair Housing Act to bring
an action for discrimination against non-whites. Id. at 209-10. They alleged injury to them-
selves-the loss of an important benefit of association-due to the exclusion of minority per-
sons from the apartment complex. Id.
The Patee court viewed Trafficante as providing the exclusive factual setting in which an
action challenging discrimination directed against others could be brought. Patee, 803 F.2d at
479. The court stated that because the male employees were not alleging that they had been
deprived of associational rights, they were not "persons aggrieved." Id.
The Patee court's reliance on Trafficante was unjustified. In Trafficante, the Court was
willing to permit a suit to be brought by persons only indirectly harmed by discrimination.
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212. However, the Patee court relied upon Trafficante to reject claims
by males that they had been directly harmed by salary discrimination against females. Patee,
803 F.2d at 478-79. Thus, in Patee, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow the males to challenge
their own salary, which was allegedly lower because of illegal discrimination, because the dis-
crimination was aimed primarily at others, id. at 478-a very strange result, indeed, for the
court to reach.
Presumably if the female occupants of the job in Patee were to prevail on a comparable
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Identifying comparable worth plans as sex classifications does not
render them impermissible; it simply means that they are subject to scru-
tiny under Title VII and the equal protection clause. Given that the os-
tensible purpose of most comparable worth plans is to remedy some sort
of perceived discrimination against women, even if only by society in
general, then the standards to be applied to determine the validity of
comparable worth plans should be the same constitutional and statutory
standards used to determine the validity of affirmative action plans.
IV. COMPARABLE WORTH PLANS AND TITLE VII
A. Title VII Standards Applicable to Affirmative Action Plans
The two leading cases dealing with voluntary affirmative action
plans challenged under Title VII are United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber 8 and Johnson v. Transportation Agency. 9  In Weber, the
Supreme Court of the United States addressed the legality of an affirma-
tive action plan established by Kaiser Aluminum. 6° The plan reserved
fifty percent of the openings in an in-plant craft-training program for
black employees until the percentage of black craft workers in the plant
equalled the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.6 Although the
affirmative action plan was held lawful under Title VII, the Court de-
clined "to define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible
and impermissible affirmative action plans."'62 However, the Court iden-
tified certain features of the Kaiser plan that it favored, without stating
whether they were necessary attributes of a permissible affirmative action
plan. These factors included: (1) whether there is a "conspicuous racial
imbalance" in "traditionally segregated job categories";63 (2) whether the
worth theory and achieve an adjustment of their wages, then the males could raise an Equal
Pay Act claim if their wages were not equally raised, unless the court would hold that the
adjustment to female wages was based upon "a factor other than sex," 29 U.S.C. § 206. In
such a case, the males would not be entitled to an adjustment. See infra notes 168-75, and
accompanying text for a discussion of Ende v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 757 F.2d
176 (7th Cir. 1985) (University's application of "affirmative action equity adjustment formula"
to salaries of female faculty members did not violate male faculty members' rights).
In any event, even under the holding in Patee, males in predominantly male occupations
who were not entitled to an adjustment in wages would have standing to challenge a compara-
ble worth plan. Patee, 803 F.2d at 478. Females in the same occupation, however, would lack
standing because they would not be permitted to claim that they were being treated like men.
Id. at 478.
58. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
59. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
60. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
61. Id. at 199.
62. Id. at 208.
63. Id. at 208-09.
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plan "unnecessarily trammels" the rights of non-minorities;" and (3)
whether the plan is "temporary.1
65
Eight years later, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court
refined the Weber standards.6 In Johnson, a male employee challenged a
voluntary affirmative action plan that led to the promotion of a less-qual-
ified woman to the position of road dispatcher.6 At the time of the
promotion, women held none of the 238 skilled-craft positions. 8 The
district court found that the Agency had not engaged in prior discrimina-
tion and the finding was not disturbed on appeal.69 Nonetheless, the
Ninth Circuit held that notwithstanding the absence of prior discrimina-
tion by the Agency, the affirmative action plan was appropriate to rem-
edy "societal discrimination."70 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit ruling, holding that the plan was a permissible method of "reme-
dying underrepresentation."71
1. Justification: manifest imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories
The most significant of the three Weber factors-that the plan be
"designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance... in traditionally
segregated job categories" 72 -must be satisfied if any form of preference
is to be justified. This requirement appears to encompass both the scope
of the racial imbalance and its causes. In Weber, only 5 of the 273
skilled-craft workers at the plant were black, while the local work force
was approximately thirty-nine percent black. 3 The Supreme Court la-
belled the racial imbalance "manifest,"7 4 but gave no clue concerning the
required magnitude of the imbalance. In Johnson, the Court stated that
the imbalance "need not be such that it would support a prima facie case
against the employer .... ,,1 Apparently, the only requirement is that
the imbalance be large or obvious to the naked eye without the need for a
complex statistical analysis.
In its ruling in Weber, the Court also failed to define the phrase
64. Id. at 208.
65. Id. at 208-09.
66. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
67. Id. at 623-26.
68. Id. at 621.
69. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 770 F.2d 752, 758 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 759.
71. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641.
72. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
73. Id. at 198-99.
74. Id.
75. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
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"traditionally segregated job categories." Lower courts were uncertain
after Weber whether the phrase meant that only employers who had en-
gaged in prior discrimination may implement an affirmative action pro-
gram.76 In Weber, there had been no finding that Kaiser or the union
had discriminated in the past, but the Court observed that "[j]udicial
findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to
make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice."'77 However, it
did not indicate whether the inference to be drawn was that Kaiser had
itself discriminated, or whether instead it was suggesting that in light of
this pervasive discrimination throughout the industry that it did not mat-
ter whether Kaiser had participated in that discrimination.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court resolved the question of whether
prior discrimination is required before an employer may adopt an affirm-
ative action program. 78 The Court held that the sex-based preference in
Johnson was validly adopted "for the purpose of remedying under-
representation."79 The Court, however, did not address the issue of why
underrepresentation, by itself, warranted a remedy. Moreover, the
Court's use of the word "remedy" is ambiguous, since ordinarily a rem-
edy is thought of as an action taken to correct a wrong.80
Although the Court's language could be read to suggest that a desire
to "balance the numbers" is justification for a racial or sexual preference,
the Court added that "[tihe requirement that the 'manifest imbalance'
76. See, e.g., Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985)
(statistical disparities combined with city's admission of past discrimination in consent decree
sufficient), aff'd, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Johnson, 770 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1984) ("It is suffi-
cient for the employer to show a conspicuous imbalance in its work force."), aff'd, 480 U.S.
616 (1987); Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
proposition that statistical imbalance is sufficient), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1620 (1987), on remand,
836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989); Bratton v. City of De-
troit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.) (all that need be shown is "'a sound basis for concluding that
minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrim-
ination is impeding access [and promotion] of minorities' ") (quoting Detroit Police Officer's
Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981), modified,
712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co.,
657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir.) (en bane) ("employer's internal investigation and analysis of its
work force which results in a conclusion of a racially imbalanced work force would satisfy the
employer's burden"), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Local Union No. 35 of the Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980) (no findings of past discrimi-
nation by each union required; sufficient that there be finding of discrimination in industry as
whole), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
77. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1.
78. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634.
79. Id.
80. See, eg., WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1920 (3d ed. 1966) (defines
"remedy" as "[t]hat [which] corrects or counteracts an evil" and as "[t]he legal means to
recover a right, or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong").
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relate to a 'traditionally segregated job category' provides assurance...
that sex or race will be taken into account in a manner consistent with
Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of employment
discrimination."81
Given that the Court has expressly rejected the view that a lack of
proportional representation by itself offends Title VII, and Section 703(j)
of the statute itself is clear that it does not, 2 it is difficult to understand
how achieving proportional representation bears any relation to "Title
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of employment discrimination.1
8 3
Moreover, if proportional representation were in fact a permissible goal
under Title VII, there would be no reason to limit affirmative action
plans to "traditionally segregated" job categories.
The only reading of Johnson that makes sense is that the phrase "the
effects of employment discrimination" is very broad and includes not
only the effects of the employer's discrimination or, for that matter, any
employer's discrimination, but also the effects "of societal attitudes that
have limited entry of... a particular sex, into certain jobs."'8 4 Thus, the
phrase must include situations where the job in question "has not been
regarded by women themselves as desirable work."81 5  Of course, that
leads us back to the question of whether Title VII was intended to influ-
ence voluntary choices by minorities and women. The Johnson majority
posits no clear answer but the opinion implies that it was.86
In spite of the confusion from Weber and Johnson over the interpre-
tation of "'manifest imbalance' . . . [in a] traditionally segregated job
category,"'87 some conclusions may be drawn. First, the "'manifest im-
balance" requirement means that the imbalance must be large, or at least
not trivial. Second, the restriction to "traditionally segregated job cate-
81. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added).
82. Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
83. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
84. Id. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. The Court in Johnson failed to cite any legislative history for the proposition that
Congress in 1964 viewed Title VII as a means of changing not only the discriminatory forces
exerted by employers but the attitudes and actions of employees. The Court also failed to
provide any policy justification for compelling women to alter their traditional attitudes con-
cerning the desirability of particular jobs. A policy of permitting individuals to make their
own value choices concerning what is desirable work is certainly more consistent with notions
of individual freedom than are attempts by the government to channel these choices. Only
where a clear societal consensus exists should the law be used as a tool of "consciousness
raising." It is doubtful that a societal consensus exists that women should move into tradition-
ally male jobs; the extent of the consensus is probably that women should be permitted to
move into these positions if they wish to do so.
87. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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gories" means that the employer may not rely simply on a numerical
imbalance and automatically implement a preference any time a pro-
tected class is underrepresented.8 8 Rather, the employer must show that
the underrepresentation is long-standing and is the result of discrimina-
tion by either the employer itself or by society. s9 Although not an oner-
ous requirement, since the Court appears willing to take judicial notice of
long-standing imbalances, it is nonetheless a requirement that must be
met before an employer may impose a voluntary affirmative action
program.
2. Scrutiny of the means
a. unnecessary trammeling
Once the initial requirements for implementing an affirmative action
plan are established, the propriety of the plan will depend upon whether
it satisfies the other Weber requirements.90 The additional requirements
are designed primarily to ensure that an undue burden is not placed upon
members of groups that are not favored by the plan. In the words of the
Weber Court, the plan must not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of
[other] employees." 91 The Court held that the plan in Weber did not
unnecessarily trammel, since it neither required the discharge of white
employees nor created an "absolute bar" to their advancement. 92 The
Court considered the plan adopted in Johnson as even more moderate
than the Weber plan since it did not set aside any positions but merely
considered race and sex as "plus" factors.
9 3
It is not clear exactly what constitutes unnecessary trammeling. A
one-hundred percent minority set-aside would surely meet this criterion,
and a plan that required the termination or layoff of existing employees
to make room for members of a protected group would probably consti-
tute unnecessary trammeling as well.94 Perhaps the permanent passing
over of an employee for a promotion would also qualify.
95
88. This calls into question the methods adopted by the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs, under which "a statistical imbalance is tantamount to a finding of discrimi-
nation." See Abram, supra note 3, at 1320.
89. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630-37.
90. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.
94. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984) (Court re-
fused to uphold court-ordered modification of consent decree that would have allowed em-
ployer to lay off non-minority employees before minority employees).
95. In assessing whether an affirmative action plan results in unnecessary trammelling, a
distinction between quotas and goals is often drawn. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
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b. temporariness
A valid affirmative action plan must also be "temporary," 96
although in application this requirement is not an onerous one. In
Weber, the Court stated that the plan was temporary because it was "not
intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest
racial imbalance."97 Moreover, the racial preference would end "as soon
as the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the... plant approxi-
mate[d] the percentage of blacks in the local labor force."9 8 The Court
gave no consideration to the fact that at the rate blacks were moving into
craft positions, it would have taken a minimum of twenty years to
achieve that goal.
Similarly, in Johnson, the Court stated that the lack of an "explicit
end date" did not constitute a defect, since the "Agency's flexible, case-
U.S. 616, 636 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177-79 (1987). However, the
basis for that distinction is less than clear in the context of voluntary affirmative action where
the focus is the burden on the unsuccessful non-minority. Whether the successful candidate
was slightly less qualified, only marginally qualified, or even unqualified, the harm to the non-
minority is the same if race was the "but for" cause of his rejection. See Logue v. International
Rehabilitation Assoc., 837 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying "but for" test in determining
whether decision that was partially based on discriminatory considerations violated Title VII);
Haskins v. United States Dept. of Army, 808 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 68 (1987); Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (same).
The quota-versus-goal distinction is more relevant in the context of court-ordered affirma-
tive action programs, since equitable concerns require a more flexible approach. For example,
a court should not establish an inflexible quota that would cause an employer to sacrifice its
business by hiring substantially less qualified workers. On the other hand, where the employer
voluntarily implements a program, it is not clear why the lack of flexibility should invalidate
an otherwise permissible program.
96. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 ("the plan [must be] a temporary measure, not designed to
maintain racial balance, but to 'eliminate manifest racial imbalance' "); Johnson, 480 U.S. at
630 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
97. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. In cases other than those involving layoffs, the distinction
between attaining and maintaining balance is not clear. For example, consider an employer
who has achieved a racially or sexually balanced work force under a voluntary affirmative
action plan. Due to unforeseen economic circumstances, the employer is forced to lay off a
substantial number of employees. Protecting the employees hired under the voluntary affirma-
tive action plan against layoffs may be impermissible under the reasoning of Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text, because of the
impermissible burden placed on non-minority employees. As a result, a disproportionate
number of persons hired under the voluntary plan may be laid off. If they are able to find other
employment or are otherwise unavailable when business picks up, the question arises whether
the employer may engage in affirmative action to restore balance to its work force.
If a new plan is adopted, it could be argued that the employer is not maintaining balance,
because balance does not exist, but rather that the employer is attempting to attain balance.
On the other hand, it could be argued as forcefully that the employer seeks to "maintain
balance" under Weber whenever it employs preferences after balance has been achieved, even
though the balance is later destroyed.
98. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
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by-case approach was not expected to yield success in a brief period of
time."9 9 The Court also stated that "[e]xpress assurance that a program
is only temporary may be necessary if the program actually sets aside
positions according to specific numbers. '""o° However, since the remedy
in Johnson was designed not simply to overcome the effects of past dis-
crimination, but to overcome the effects of private choice on the part of
women, it is doubtful that the long-term goal of the Agency-the same
proportion of women in skilled-craft positions as in the general work
force-would ever be met in the absence of radical social changes.
Lower courts that have addressed the temporariness requirement
have demonstrated that it is an insignificant hurdle. For example, the
voluntary affirmative action plan adopted by the Detroit Police Depart-
ment in 1974 was deemed temporary, even though it was not scheduled
to terminate until 1990.10' In another case, EEOC v. Local 638,102 the
Second Circuit stated that "'temporary' in the context of the imposition
of affimative action remedies means that the remedies will be in place
only until the effects of past discrimination have been eliminated."
' 10 3
In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court's conclusion
that a plan was not temporary because it had no end date, largely on the
ground that the plan did not expressly state that it was to be perma-
nent.104 Other courts have found the temporariness requirement satisfied
when the plan was contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, be-
cause the plan would expire when the agreement expired. 10 5
c. narrow tailoring
There appears to be an additional requirement that the Court has
not yet explicitly labelled as a "factor," but is implicit in the reasoning of
both Weber and Johnson. This requirement, which has been recognized
99. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639. Thus, paradoxically, the Court seems to imply that the plan
satisfied the temporariness requirement because it was expected to remain in place for a long
time.
100. Id.
101. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 882, 892 (6th Cir.), modified, 712 F.2d 222
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
102. 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985).
103. Id. at 1187; see also Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 510 (8th Cir.) ("temporary"
plan is one that "endures only so long as is reasonably necessary to achieve its legitimate
goals"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
104. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 770 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S.
616 (1987).
105. See, e.g., Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1232
(N.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 288
.(1987); Breschard v. Directors Guild of Am., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1045 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
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by some lower courts, is that the preference itself, not just "some rem-
edy," be necessary to achieve the goal sought to be furthered by the pref-
erence. For example, in a post-Johnson decision invalidating an
affirmative action plan adopted by the District of Columbia Fire Depart-
ment, the District of Columbia Circuit expressly recognized that there is
a "well-settled requirement that alternatives to race-based measures be
considered and, if possible, employed."' 1 6 The court rejected the argu-
ment that such alternatives need not be considered "as long as no equally
efficacious remedies are apparent."10 7 This requirement parallels the
"narrow-tailoring" requirement under the equal protection clause.'08
The narrow-tailoring requirement is consistent with the concerns of
the Weber Court. In Weber, the Court was concerned that rigid applica-
tion of Title VII principles would thwart attempts to "abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."'0 9 As emphasized in Jus-
tice Blackmun's concurrence, if Title VII were to be read literally, em-
ployers would be confronted with the dilemma of facing lawsuits by
blacks or women when they were substantially underrepresented, or of
facing reverse-discrimination lawsuits if the employers attempted to elim-
inate the underrepresentation." On the other hand, where equally effec-
tive non-discriminatory methods of eliminating disparities exist, the
employer is not confronted with this dilemma because it can avoid re-
verse-discrimination lawsuits by adopting a neutral method of achieving
the desired result, while at the same time reducing the risk of traditional
discrimination actions.
In affirmative action cases that deal with hiring and promotion, the
106. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988);
see also J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1362 (4th Cir. 1987) aff'd, 57
U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989) (" Wygant ... limit[s] racial preferences to what is neces-
sary to redress a practice of past wrongdoing."); Britton, 819 F.2d at 772 (striking down plan
because it "goes further than necessary to preserve blacks' gains"); Rutherglen & Ortiz, Af-
firmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII From Confusion to Convergence, 35
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 467, 501 (1988) ("Whether the case involves a voluntary or court-ordered
preference or a Title VII or equal protection claim, this part of the test remains the same: the
preference must be necessary and the alternatives ineffective.").
107. Hammon, 826 F.2d at 81 n.12.
108. See id. at 81 ("[Tihe 'tailoring' requirement [is] embodied in a plethora of Title VII
law."); see also Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 106, at 483 (in assessing burden on white
employees, the Supreme Court has "relied on essentially the same reasoning under either
standard").
109. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204.
110. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Johnson, amicus briefs by employers
uniformly supported the legality of voluntary affirmative action, largely because by engaging in
affirmative action an employer can decrease the prospects of Title VII actions by minorities
and women even though at the expense of non-minorities and males. 480 U.S. at 677 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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option of achieving the same result in the same amount of time without
preferences is not available. Because the purpose of such plans is to ac-
celerate integration of the work force beyond the rate that would prevail
simply by removing artificial barriers, and because there is generally a
finite number of positions available, the only way to achieve the goal is to
grant a preference. However, where effective non-discriminatory meth-
ods of achieving the desired goals exist, the justification for preferences
provided by the Court in Weber and Johnson no longer exists. Conse-
quently, there is nothing to overcome the presumption against race and
sex classifications.
One could view the requirement of an absence of nondiscriminatory
options in several ways. First, it could be seen as a predicate for an af-
firmative action plan; that is, a preference is justified where there are
manifest imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories that cannot
be remedied effectively without a preference. Second, it could be seen as
a restriction on the means by which an affirmative action plan may be
implemented; thus, an affirmative action plan must be the least discrimi-
natory plan that could be devised.
If the second analysis were adopted, the requirement could either be
an additional Weber requirement or, more simply, be regarded as part of
the unnecessary trammeling requirement. Even a modest burden on
males or non-minorities would be an unnecessary one in the absence of a
need to employ a preference.111 It may make little difference which of
the analyses is adopted, but if the justification for affirmative action is
that racial or sexual preferences are a necessary evil," 2 a showing that
they are "necessary" is a threshold issue.113
111. See Hammon, 826 F.2d at 80-81.
112. See Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 78, 98 (1986).
113. It is also argued that affirmative action plans need not be subjected to rigorous scrutiny
if they do not impose a stigma on non-minorities. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356-62 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 511 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981) ("members
of the majority group are rarely, if ever, stigmatized by operation of a racial preference"). See
also Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrus" A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1336 (1986) ("injury suffered by white 'victims' of affirmative action
does not properly give rise to a constitutional claim, because the damage does not derive from
a scheme animated by racial prejudice"). The Court rejected this analysis under the equal
protection clause in J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 57 U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1989).
See infra text accompanying note 195.
The argument that stigma is the sine qua non of invidious discrimination is simply an
attempt to define affirmative action categorically as non-invidious. If the stigma argument is
accepted, all affirmative action is permissible, so the existence vel non of stigma cannot be used
to separate valid affirmative action plans from invalid ones. Moreover, it is not clear what the
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B. Application of Title VII Standards to Comparable Worth Plans
Few comparable worth plans would measure up to even a generous
interpretation of Weber and Johnson. Even if an employer could demon-
strate that proper justification for a comparable worth program exists, it
would be unlikely that it could also demonstrate that a sex-conscious
system is needed to correct the disparity.
1. Justification
The typical sex-conscious comparable worth plan does not satisfy
either of the two underlying purposes of the requirement that there be
"'manifest imbalance' . . . in 'traditionally segregated job catego-
ries.' 114 Sex-conscious comparable worth programs fail to ensure that:
(1) sex-based preferences are established only when major disparities ex-
ist, so that they do not become a mechanism for perpetual social engi-
term "majority" means to advocates of the stigma argument, since women constitute a major-
ity of the population of the United States, yet there is no indication that the "stigma" propo-
nents question the legitimacy of sex-based affirmative action. Moreover, when predominantly
black cities such as Washington, D.C., Detroit, and Richmond implement preferences favoring
blacks, it is not a majority giving preference to a minority, but rather, the majority creating a
preference for itself. See J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 57 U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 24,
1989) (noting that a majority of seats on the Richmond City Council were held by blacks).
Furthermore, stigma is in the eyes of the beholder. In assessing the validity of other
forms of "benign" discrimination, such as protective laws for women, courts have not found
persuasive the argument that these laws did not stigmatize. Undoubtedly, those opposing such
laws would argue that the assumption that women need protection that men do not need is
stigmatizing. However, if this view of stigma is accepted, affirmative action plans also stigma-
tize since they imply that minorities require preferences to succeed.
The concept of stigma is relied upon only when someone wants to argue in favor of an
affirmative action plan. One rarely hears of stigma when assessing the validity of a program
that has an adverse impact on women or minorities. For example, employer practices that are
not shaped by an intent to discriminate may nonetheless be declared illegal under Title VII if
they result in a disparate impact against a protected class regardless of whether the practices
are viewed as stigmatizing. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For example,
employers' policies against beards have been held to violate Title VII when they resulted in
excluding black workers suffering from the condition known aspseudofolliculitis barbae, a skin
condition suffered by blacks at disproportionate rates that is exacerbated by shaving. EEOC v.
Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Colo. 1981). But see EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
494 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (judgment reversed
against employer with no-beards policy because no adverse impact on black male employees
shown). Yet, no one has argued that blacks are stigmatized by a no-beard policy. The argu-
ment is simply that they are excluded from jobs at a disproportionate rate. Similarly, height
and weight requirements have been struck down without any finding that they stigmatize wo-
men. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Also, requiring higher pension contri-
butions from women because they live longer has been held unlawful, even though the
conclusion that women live longer than men cannot be viewed as stigmatizing women. See
Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
114. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (1987) (quoting United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)).
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neering; and (2) preferences are implemented only when there is a long-
standing, perhaps structural, problem that is caused by discrimination of
either employers or society-at-large, that will likely persist without some
intervention.
Typical sex-conscious plans allow for salary adjustments on a purely
mathematical basis without regard to whether the disparities in compen-
sation are manifest or conspicuous. Moreover, adjustments are made
whenever a wage imbalance for a particular job exists and are based
solely upon whether the job in question is female-dominated at that mo-
ment. There is no separate consideration of any possible underlying rea-
sons for the disparity sought to be corrected; instead, the decision to
make an adjustment is purely a mathematical one-the type the Court in
Johnson suggested would not be permissible. 115
If adjustments are based solely upon an imbalance in male and fe-
male wages, there seems little reason not to conclude that almost any far-
reaching, statistically suspect scheme would be considered permissible.
For example, consider an employer's grant of a fifty percent across-the-
board increase to all female employees. If women make sixty-six cents
for every dollar earned by males, a fifty percent increase also yields
equality.
16
115. Id. at 636 ("had the Plan simply calculated imbalances in all categories according to
the proportion of women in the area labor pool, and then directed that hiring be governed
solely by those figures, its validity fairly could be called into question").
116. Proponents of comparable worth may argue that by raising the wages of female-domi-
nated occupations to equal the wages of male-dominated occupations, the same standard is
being applied equally to both occupations. However, the comparable worth adjustment will
result in a benefit to occupants of female-dominated jobs that is not available to occupants of
male-dominated jobs. For example, assume that there are four male-dominated occupations,
paying $18,000, $20,000, $20,000, and $22,000, respectively, and four comparable female-dom-
inated occupations, paying $16,000, $18,000, $20,000, and $22,000 respectively. Males in this
example average $20,000 per year, and females average $19,000 per year for comparable work.
This is a situation where most comparable worth advocates would call for a remedy.
The remedy under a one-way comparable worth plan would probably be that occupants of
each of the underpaid, female-dominated fields would be entitled to the average wage for com-
parable male-dominated occupations ($20,000 per year). Thus, one female would be entitled
to a $4,000 raise, and another would be entitled to a $2,000 raise. The other two females,
whose salaries equal or exceed the male average, would not be entitled to an increase. After
the adjustment, the average male salary is the lowest that an occupant of a female-dominated
occupation could be paid, which causes the female average to be increased above the male
average. Under a two-way plan, the male who earns $18,000 would also be entitled to a rem-
edy--either $1,000 to raise his salary to equal the pre-adjustment female average, or $2,000, to
equal the post-adjustment female average. However, if there were employees occupying bal-
anced classifications doing comparable work but earning only $18,000, they would not be enti-
tled to any increase.
Another suggestion for remedying the underpayment of females has been to "raise the
[compensation] rate of each female-dominated job by a fixed percentage, equal to the percent
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It may not matter a great deal in principle, as opposed to doctrine,
whether the imbalance in compensation is large or small. If the disparity
is one that truly should be remedied, the fact that the appropriate remedy
is a small amount is of little concern, unless it is so small that it is de
minimis. However, it does matter whether the compensation imbalance
and the sex-segregated nature of the jobs are long-standing since propo-
nents of comparable worth rely in large part on "the long history of di-
rect discrimination in the establishment of wage rates for women" prior
to implementation of the Equal Pay Act.117
The majority in Johnson recognized that the propriety of an affirma-
tive action program depends upon whether it attempts to remedy struc-
tural problems in the work force, even if the employer is not responsible
for the imbalance.' A comparable worth plan that provides a remedy
for employees in positions that have only recently come to be dominated
by a single sex or to be underpaid does not remedy a structural problem;
rather, it provides a windfall to the occupants of female-dominated posi-
tions. Applying a comparable worth plan to employees in jobs that re-
flect recent changes in compensation or in sex composition gives a class
of employees-defined by sex-an opportunity to increase its salaries,
while at the same time achieving none of the societal benefit that the
Court has identified as the purpose of affirmative action programs." 9
Applying the "traditionally segregated job categories" criterion to
two-way comparable worth plans-those in which male-dominated occu-
pations obtain an increase if they are underpaid as compared to compara-
ble female-dominated occupations-demonstrates that such plans are
even more suspect than one-way plans. The primary argument of propo-
nents of comparable worth is that it is necessary because society values a
woman's work less than it values a man's. Proponents do not argue that
the purpose of comparable worth plans is to equalize male and female
salaries; instead, they argue that they wish to eliminate the portion of the
compensation differential that is due to sex discrimination, although they
generally assume that whenever a female job is underpaid it is because of
sex discrimination. 2 There is no reason to believe, however, that two-
differential between the average rate of the female-dominated jobs and the average rate of the
male-dominated and integrated jobs." Clauss, supra note 1, at 87. Although such a method
may be preferable to raising the salary of each woman to the average male salary, it will result
in salary increases to women who are already paid more than the male average and deny
increases to males whose wages may be below the minimum female salary.
117. Id. at 56.
118. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627-30.
119. Id. at 632.
120. See TREIMAN & CHENG, supra note 21, at 7.
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way plans have been adopted out of a belief that wages in certain male-
dominated jobs are lower simply because the jobs are held by males.
Two-way plans then-even more than one-way plans-appear to be ve-
hicles for achieving societal balance for its own sake, similar to the "blind
hiring by the numbers" approach condemned in Johnson.
121
In sum, in order to satisfy the "traditionally segregated job catego-
ries" requirement of Weber,122 a comparable worth plan should be lim-
ited to apply only to those positions traditionally held by females that are
historically and manifestly underpaid. Otherwise, it must be concluded
that the sex preference is merely "discrimination for its own sake."'
123
2. Means
Whether a sex-conscious comparable worth plan results in an "un-
necessary trammeling" of the interests of males is subject to debate. The
purpose of the unnecessary trammeling requirement is to minimize the
burden borne by innocent third parties due to the implementation of a
race or sex preference. 24 However, only an unnecessary burden is for-
bidden, since the Supreme Court has recognized that some burden is al-
lowed.1 25  As discussed previously, in affirmative action plans dealing
with hiring and promotion, the burden on innocent third parties arises
when the plan establishes quotas for hiring or promotions or when the
plan stands as an absolute bar to non-minority hiring or promotion.
26
121. See Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023
(1988); Janowiak v. City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1620
(1987), on remand, 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb.
27, 1989).
If the employer has intentionally engaged in illegal sex discrimination in setting wages,
discrimination may be remedied even if the remedy affects positions that are neither tradition-
ally female nor traditionally underpaid. However, the remedy should be limited to employees
who have actually been discriminated against, rather than being applied to all employees. It is
unlikely that many comparable worth plans could be supported by a showing of employer
discrimination considering the number of unsuccessful plaintiffs raising comparable worth
claims under Title VII. Moreover, most plans apply to all job classifications, not merely those
for which discrimination can be shown. This overbreadth is likely to be fatal to the plan even
if there is evidence of discrimination in some job categories. See City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, 57 U.S.L.W. 4132, 4142 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989) ("overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial
preference strongly impugns the City's claim of remedial motivation"); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278 (1986) (rejecting "prior discrimination" justification in part
because plan favored racial groups for whom no showing of prior discrimination was even
attempted).
122. Weber, 443 U.S. at 203.
123. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
124. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of "unnecessary
trammeling."
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The burden placed on occupants of male-dominated positions by a
sex-conscious comparable worth plan seems to be of a smaller magnitude
than the burdens found acceptable in Weber and Johnson.1 27 The direct.
costs of comparable worth adjustments are paid by the employer rather
than the employees who are not eligible for an adjustment. Occupants of
male-dominated or sex-balanced positions simply fail to receive the same
pecuniary benefit that female employees receive.
128
Affirmative action plans dealing with hiring and promotions, argua-
bly unlike plans dealing with compensation, are essentially zero-sum
games. One applicant for the position will win; the other will lose. In
programs involving compensation, however, the game is only indirectly
between different employees. An employee is not harmed by the fact that
another employee is being compensated differently, as long as his or her
wage is not affected by a decrease in the fund from which the employer
might grant an increase.
The requirement that the employee's wage not be affected may sel-
dom be met, so employees not eligible for pay adjustments may in fact
bear the burden of the comparable worth plan after all. Substantial in-
creases for certain employees may result in smaller general wage adjust-
ments for other employees, since there would be an accompanying
reduction in the fund from which wage increases would come. It would
be the unusual case, at least in the private sector, where substantial pay
increases could be made to a large number of employees that would not
affect wage increases of others. Even in the public sector, if wage in-
creases come out of a general fund, there is likely to be a substantial
effect on individuals not entitled to an increase. Moreover, in the private
sector, competitive pressures may prevent the employer from implement-
ing a substantial overall increase in wages.
If legislation requiring comparable worth were adopted for private-
sector employees, it would be necessary also to consider whether the em-
ployer's interest is unnecessarily trammeled. For example, if the legisla-
tion required that no wages be lowered to achieve equality, an employer
may be harmed substantially more by being required to implement com-
127. See supra notes 58-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Johnson and Weber.
128. Although some might argue that these people lack standing to challenge the classifica-
tion because they are not harmed, it is unlikely that those making the argument would endorse
it as a generally applicable principle. Certainly, no one would argue that an employer who
granted an across-the-board wage increase exclusively to its white employees would be insu-
lated from challenges by its black employees because the black employees were not harmed.
Moreover, no one could seriously argue that the employer could defend its action by providing
that if it had not limited its wage increases to white employees, it would not have granted
increases to anyone.
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parable worth than it would by being required to implement a more
traditional plan. The zero-sum character of hiring and promotion plans
means that apart from the inefficiencies that may result from hiring or
promotion not based solely on merit, and aside from any opposition the
employer may have in principle to affirmative action, it does not matter
to the employer whether applicant A or applicant B is hired. The em-
ployer will spend the same amount on salaries and benefits for approxi-
mately the same amount of work.
On the other hand, when an employer is forced to adopt a compara-
ble worth plan, the employer is directly burdened, since the plan requires
an increase of wages to some of its employees and thereby increases total
labor costs. Of course, if the employer is permitted to offset the wage
increases by decreasing future wage increases to others, the employer it-
self may escape the burden, though it might have to bear a cost in terms
of lower employee morale. In such a case, the financial burden is placed
on employees who do not receive the comparable worth adjustment.
Even if some employees are financially harmed by the comparable
worth plan, it is unlikely that the burden would be considered unduly
onerous, since here, unlike in other kinds of affirmative action programs,
the burden would be diffused among numerous employees. 129 Each em-
ployee who does not receive an increase may suffer a reduction in the
amount his wages might have increased, although probably not a reduc-
tion in the amount of current wages. Moreover, any reduction will be
speculative, except in the rare case where the employer cancels a previ-
ously announced increase in order to make the comparable worth adjust-
ment. In sum, depending upon the nature of the comparable worth plan,
it may be appropriate to consider whether the interests of either the em-
ployee or the employer are trammeled. However, it is doubtful that
many comparable worth plans would be invalidated as being excessively
burdensome.
3. Temporariness
Unlike hiring and promotion plans, it is not clear that the need for
comparable worth will ever end. The theory behind hiring and promo-
tion preferences is that the end result would eventually be achieved with-
out adoption of the preference, but 'achievement of the desired goal is
129. However, the burden may be considered unnecessary, since a preference may not have
been necesssary. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's narrowly tailored requirement in Title VII cases.
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accelerated. 3 ' Such plans create skilled minority and female workers
who theoretically, at some point, will no longer need preferences. The
goal sought by comparable worth advocates, however, suggests that the
desired result might never be achieved. A quarter of a century after im-
plementation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII and eradication of the
majority of overt sex discrimination in employment and compensation,
advocates of comparable worth argue that little progress has been made
in raising the overall wages of females to a level equal to that of males. 3
Typical comparable worth plans call for continual adjustments. For
example, the Minnesota plan requires reassessment of compensation
every two years. 132 Whenever a new assessment reveals a compensation
disparity between jobs that someone has declared comparable, a wage
adjustment is required. 133 Because the system focuses on outcome,
rather than on process, the system could continue in perpetuity.
If the goal of a comparable worth plan were simply to attain, rather
than maintain, the desired equality of compensation-a distinction that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared important in hiring and pro-
motion cases 3 4 --all that would be necessary is a one-time adjustment to
wages and the goal would be accomplished. After the adjustment, the
market would simply take over.1 35 If the Court's decisions require cessa-
tion of affirmative action once the goal is met, then comparable worth
plans requiring continual reevaluation and readjustment should be con-
sidered invalid.
Proponents of comparable worth would likely argue that a one-time
adjustment to wages that resulted in balance between male- and female-
dominated occupations would not be an adequate solution. They would
claim that there is a difference between comparable worth plans and
130. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (Kaiser plan adopted
to "hasten the elimination" of the vestiges of discrimination).
131. Johnson & Solon, The Attainment of Pay Equity Between the Sexes by Legal Means: An
Economic Analysis, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183, 183 (1986).
132. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Minnesota Plan.
133. For example, the San Francisco city charter requires an annual salary survey for the
purpose of making comparable worth adjustments to the wages of women and minorities. San
Francisco Charter § 8.407-1 (1988).
134. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639; Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 448 (1986); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also United States v. Starrett City Assocs.,
840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.) (use of "ceiling quotas" by subsidized private apartment com-
plex to avoid "white flight" and remain racially integrated improper attempt at "maintaining
racial balance"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988).
135. In Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09, the Court held that an affirmative action plan designed
merely to attain a racial balance was valid. The Court stated that "[p]referential selection" of
trainees would end once the imbalance was eliminated, implying that anti-discrimination re-
quirements would suffice thereafter to maintain equality. Id.
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other kinds of affirmative action plans, since typical affirmative action
plans also prohibit discrimination. Once discrimination in hiring and
promotion has been eradicated and work forces have achieved the de-
sired balance, then there is no reason not to let the market take its course,
because the market has been corrected. However, proponents of compa-
rable worth plans would argue that elimination of a comparable worth
plan after the desired equality of compensation is achieved would proba-
bly result in the reestablishment of the status quo ante, because the socie-
tal attitudes that created the disparities will remain largely unchanged.
The proponents' argument has some validity, but its validity is es-
tablished only by demonstrating a substantial flaw in the concept of com-
parable worth, which is that it is entirely a symptomatic treatment for a
largely undiagnosed, and perhaps undiagnosable, problem. Comparable
worth plans do nothing to alter whatever it was that produced the com-
pensation patterns that prevail today; neither according to its advocates,
do existing laws that ban sex discrimination in compensation. 136 There-
fore, the effect of comparable worth plans is similar to the effect that
would be achieved by implementation of hiring and promotion goals
without prohibiting discrimination.
According to many advocates of comparable worth, one of the pri-
mary causes of the wage gap is that the activities of women are generally
accorded less respect by society than the activities of men. 137 Although
their conclusion may be true as a generalization, the phenomenon of
greater respect for male activities is certainly not confined to our society,
or even Western society. Instead, as anthropologist Margaret Mead has
pointed out, the phenomenon has been present in virtually all societies. 13
To the extent that this phenomenon is rooted in something in "human
nature" that encourages such value judgments, it is unlikely that a sys-
136. See Johnson & Solon, supra note 131, at 183.
137. It has been argued that the influx of women into a job category results in fewer and
smaller pay increases and removal of the category from the "promotion ladder." Blumrosen,
supra note 7, at 408 (position of bank teller formerly entry-level high-paying position; now held
by women as low-paying dead-end position); see also Carter & Carter, Women's Recent Pro-
gress in the Professions, or Women Get a Ticket to Ride After the Gravy Train Has Left the
Station, 7 FEMINIST STUDIEs 477, 480-98 (1981) (professions to which women have recently
gained access have become low-paying, routine positions lacking their former social status).
138. Margaret Mead has written:
In every known human society, the male's need for achievement can be recognized.
Men may cook, weave, dress dolls, or hunt hummingbirds, but if such activities are
appropriate occupations of men, then the whole society, men and women alike, votes
them as important. When the same occupations are performed by women, they are
regarded as less important.
M. MEAD, Male and Female 159 (1949); see also Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The
Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differences, 38 Sw. L.J. 617, 628-30 (1984).
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tern of comparable worth implemented for a finite period will perma-
nently change it.
It is likely that the only way to achieve the goal of comparable
worth advocates is to eliminate occupational segregation, which is the
tendency of females to be clustered in female-dominated occupations and
males to be clustered in male-dominated occupations. 13 9 Although some
measure of contemporary occupational segregation is a consequence of
prior, or even present, intentional sex discrimination, that form of dis-
crimination is already prohibited by the civil rights laws. 1" However, a
great deal of occupational segregation is due to voluntary choice on the
part of men and women concerning what kind of work is desirable and to
sex-based differences in aptitude and interest.41 It is safe to assume that
in our lifetime, and probably in the lifetimes of our children and
grandchildren, most auto mechanics and theoretical physicists will be
men, and most nurses and child-care workers will be women, for reasons
that transcend invidious discrimination. Ironically, if comparable worth
has any effect on occupational segregation, it may be to increase, or at
least entrench, it. By raising wages in female occupations, the financial
incentive for women to seek employment in male-dominated fields will be
substantially reduced.142 While some males may move into female occu-
pations because of higher salaries, it is questionable whether the number
of such males will equal the number of females enticed into staying in the
139. One commentator argues that data from a 1987 study of the economic effect of the
comparable worth program adopted by San Jose, California, suggest that women were not
discouraged from entry into male-dominated positions. Clauss, supra note 1, at 95. The study
indicated that after implementation of comparable worth programs, women entered male-
dominated positions at an increasing rate. Id. However, it is likely that San Jose's affirmative
action plan, rather than its comparable worth plan, was responsible for that result.
It is doubtful that raising the compensation of female-dominated positions will raise their
level of prestige in society in a way that is sufficiently enduring to prevent a market-driven
decline in wages after the comparable worth plan is eliminated. Prestige levels of particular
occupations constantly change, and there is no reason to think that whatever caused a particu-
lar job to be poorly paid prior to implementation of a comparable worth program would not
also lead to low wages after the comparable worth plan is no longer in place.
140. See supra notes 4 and 12-13 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
Civil Rights Act.
141. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (accepting district
court finding that men and women differ substantially in extent of interest in commission
selling); see also Shattuck, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: A Management View, 62 DEN.
U.L. REv. 393, 399-400 (1985); Fischel & Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination in
Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 891, 896-98 (1986).
142. See, e.g., Jonung, Patterns of Occupational Segregation by Sex in the Labor Market,
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOY-
MENT POLICY 44, 63 (1984).
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newly well-paid female-dominated occupations.. 143
Finally, the sex composition of jobs changes over time, as do the
jobs themselves and the value at which they are rated. What is now a
predominantly female occupation may become predominantly male, or
equally balanced, and its place in the comparable worth scheme will
change. Similarly, changes in job content, such as those caused by auto-
mation, will alter the demands of particular jobs in the future. There-
fore, in order to fulfill the goal of comparable worth, the jobs and their
sex composition will have to be continually reevaluated, with corre-
sponding adjustments made to compensation. This suggests that the pri-
mary beneficiaries of comparable worth are not women, but the
compensation analysts who will be conducting the studies.
The foregoing comments should not be interpreted to suggest that
comparable worth plans will not satisfy the temporariness requirement of
Weber. 14' As noted previously, the requirement is relatively easy to sat-
isfy, 145 since it seems to be the particular plan, not the need for affirma-
tive action in general, that must be temporary. 146 Any plan contained in
a collective-bargaining agreement will, presumably, expire at the end of
the agreement's term,147 and any plan mandated by statute could easily
provide for periodic review and reevaluation. If so, the standard of tem-
porariness will likely be satisfied.
4. Narrow tailoring
The final requirement under the Title VII analysis is that an affirm-
ative action plan be "narrowly tailored."' 48 The "narrowly tailored" re-
quirement means that the sex classification must be a more effective
means of achieving the goal than would be a sex-neutral method. 149
This requirement presents a more substantial hurdle for comparable
143. For example, in San Jose, while wage rates for female-dominated jobs were increasing
faster than those for male-dominated jobs, the number of women entering male-dominated jobs
increased greatly; however, the number of men entering female-dominated jobs did not.
Clauss, supra note 1, at 95. Although affirmative action programs and anti-discrimination re-
quirements have resulted in a significant movement of women into men's jobs, "there has been
almost no change in the female composition of women's jobs." Id. at 69 n.259. See supra note
139 and accompanying text.
144. 443 U.S. at 208.
145. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's
"temporariness" requirement in Title VII cases.
146. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
147. See, ag., Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794 (1985) ("The
provision was necessarily temporary because it was incorporated in a collective bargaining
agreement of limited duration.").
148. See supra notes 46-49.
149. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637.
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worth plans than it does for hiring or promotion plans. As discussed
previously, the purpose of an affirmative action plan governing hiring is
to accelerate the process of integrating the work force beyond the pace at
which integration would normally proceed. There is no effective non-
discriminatory method of achieving this acceleration because of the lim-
ited number of positions available. However, a non-discriminatory
method of eliminating wage disparities for jobs of comparable worth is
available, since a system of comparable worth could be made applicable
to all jobs and to all employees. Comparable worth systems do not have
to be sex-conscious; as previously discussed, some comparable worth sys-
tems are sex-neutral. 150 Moreover, sex-blind systems are less burden-
some to administer than sex-conscious systems, since one less variable
needs to be considered, and changes in sex composition do not require
modification of the system.
A sex-blind approach to comparable worth is apparently inconsis-
tent with the goals of most comparable worth proponents, who seek only
an adjustment of women's wages; they do not seek to affect any differen-
tials existing between male-dominated jobs, between female-dominated
jobs, or between integrated jobs.151 Comparable worth proponents are
willing to attribute the latter differentials to "market forces" or "long-
standing custom" or "random wage structure," ' 2 which, for some rea-
son, are deemed inadequate explanations when female jobs are paid less
than male jobs. Thus, although "[b]ureaucrats and judges would not...
be authorized to determine what the fair wage should be for any male-
dominated or integrated job," they would be authorized to determine the
wages for female-dominated jobs. 5 3
The justification for this different treatment is the assertion that
where differences exist between male- and female- dominated jobs of
equivalent worth, the differences exist only because of sex; differences
within male-dominated or female-dominated classifications cannot, by
definition, be due to sex. This highlights a serious problem with the fun-
damental assumption of comparable worth proponents-that differences
between compensation for male- and female-dominated positions must be
attributed to discrimination. 154 Even proponents of comparable worth
acknowledge that differences exist between jobs with identical sex com-
150. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of sex-neutral comparable
worth plans.
151. Clauss, supra note 1, at 22-23.
152. Id. at 23.
153. Id. at 23-24.
154. See id. at 55-56.
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positions."'5 They then must posit that some unknown, but sex-neutral,
factors explain those differences, while rejecting the possibility that un-
known sex-neutral factors may explain differences between male- and fe-
male-dominated positions.
A number of affirmative-action cases decided under the Equal Pay
Act have addressed the legitimacy of sex-conscious adjustments to sala-
ries, with varying conclusions. For example, in Board of Regents of the
University of Nebraska v. Dawes," 6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit examined the legality of a pay system adopted by
the University of Nebraska that was purportedly intended to equalize
male and female salaries." 7 The University identified certain factors-
education, specialization, experience, and merit-that may have contrib-
uted to the higher salaries of male professors." 8 It then assigned point
values to each variable to develop a formula describing the average
male's salary and then compared the salaries of individual females to the
salaries predicted by the formula.1 9 The University concluded that
thirty-three of one hundred twenty-five females were receiving less than
the formula salary and increased their salaries accordingly.1 60
The University's salary modification had two effects.1 61 First, it es-
tablished the male average salary as the female minimum salary, a wind-
fall to females. 162 Second, it left ninety-two of two hundred seventy-two
males with salaries less than the formula salary. 16' These males argued
that the formula should have been applied to them as well and that the
155. Id. at 20, 54; see also Blumrosen, supra note 23, at 119 (citing Commission on the
Economic Status of Women, Pay Equity: The Minnesota Experience (1985) (Minnesota study
identified male job assigned 134 points paid more per year than male job assigned 154 points,
and male job assigned 238 points paid $100 less per month than male job rated 206)).
There are many examples where the market value of a job does not reflect the job's "ob-
jective measure"; yet in many cases no plausible claim of sex discrimination can be made. For
example, clergymen earn about 30 percent less than brickmasons. Yet the clergy are largely
college graduates; the brickmasons are not. See O'Neill, A Consultation of the U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, in 1 COMPARABLE WoRTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80'S 177, 178 (1984). Both
occupations are more than 95 percent male. If clergymen were largely women, this would no
doubt be given as an example of sex discrimination. Yet, because they are both male jobs,
something else must be at work.
156. 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976).
157. Id. at 381.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 382.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 382-83.
162. Id.
163. Id. Interestingly, a greater proportion of males (92/272 or 33.8%) fell below the
formula salary than females (33/125 or 26.4%).
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University's failure to do so violated the Equal Pay Act.11 The Eighth
Circuit agreed, concluding that once the University had established a
formula for determining a minimum salary schedule, it was a violation of
the Equal Pay Act to apply it solely to one sex.1 65
The Dawes court's analysis is equally applicable to a Title VII chal-
lenge to a comparable worth plan. If an employer sets the salaries of
female- dominated occupations on the basis of skill, effort, and responsi-
bility, failure to apply those same standards to the employer's other job
classifications is a form of sex discrimination.
166
Although one would have thought it clear that application of differ-
ent standards to determine the compensation of males and females con-
stitutes sex discrimination, the Seventh Circuit endorsed such a
practice 67 in Ende v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities.161 In
Ende, the court approved payment by Northern Illinois University of an
"affirmative action equity adjustment" to female faculty members based
upon a formula that compared mean male salaries, adjusted for length of
service and rank, with the salaries of individual females.1 69 Women then
received a salary adjustment based upon the comparison with the male
mean salary. Male professors challenged the adjustment by filing com-
plaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, arguing
that their salaries would have been increased had the formula been ap-
plied to them.
170
The court rejected the challenge, accepting the University's argu-
ment that the adjustment was a valid remedial measure to equalize sala-
164. Id. at 383.
165. Id. at 384.
166. See also Lyon v. Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 543 F.
Supp. 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1982), in which the University compared the salaries of females and
minorities to salaries of males, and, in some cases, raised them. White males were not eligible
for wage adjustments, with the result that some female professors received higher salaries than
their male counterparts, solely because of their sex. Id. at 1373. The court invalidated the
plan, concluding that the University had made no showing of a "need to discriminate against
men in order to remedy any previous wage discrimination against female Temple professors."
Id. at 1375. The court held that the University would have to show that redress of past dis-
crimination could not have been accomplished "without creating new salary inequities." Id. at
1378.
The University of Colorado has recently implemented a similar policy by conducting sal-
ary reviews of all women and minority faculty members, and increasing salaries that were
below the salaries of comparable males. U. of Colorado to Raise Salaries of 154 Professors to
Correct Inequities Due to Race & Sex Bias, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., Nov. 19, 1986, at
15, col. 3.
167. Dawes, 522 F.2d at 383-84.
168. 757 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985).
169. Id. at 178.
170. Id. at 179.
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ries of males and females.1 7' The court held that the University was not
obligated to apply the formula to the salaries of male professors, because
the formula did not represent a "rate of pay" for women but rather an
"incremental adjustment to females' salaries necessary to remedy the ef-
fects of past sex discrimination and eliminate sex as a determiner of sal-
ary.''172 The court was not swayed by the fact that some of the male
professors' salaries were considerably lower than the salaries of similarly
qualified female professors and also significantly lower than the salary
they would have received had the salary formula been applied to them.17
Although the court in Ende did not reach the question of whether
Weber applied to Equal Pay Act cases,174 the Weber analysis does not
support the kind of affirmative action involved in Ende. First, the de-
sired goal in Ende-equal pay for equal work-could have been achieved
by a sex-neutral compensation system. Second, the means adopted did
not achieve equaf pay for equal work across the board, but instead simply
gave one class of employees an opportunity for a wage increase to which
another class of employees was not entitled.
The plan at issue in Ende and sex-conscious comparable worth plans
are equally incompatible with the philosophy of Title VII. The overrid-
ing purpose of Title VII is to ensure that employers apply the same terms
and conditions of employment to all employees without regard to race or
sex.1 75 Any deviations from that goal should be the exception, rather
than the rule, even if the differences favor groups that have been discrim-
inated against in the past. Only when the goal of equality in the work
place cannot be effectively achieved without racial or sexual preferences,
should abandonment of the principle of equal treatment for all individu-
als even be considered. Because the philosophy of comparable worth,
whether or not derived from Title VII, can be effectively implemented
without race or sex preferences, no such preferences are permissible
under the statute.
171. Id. at 181.
172. Id. The court stated that it was "undisputed... that before the 1975 adjustment the
salaries paid female faculty members resulted from discrimination against them." Id. at 178.
However, it appears that the basis for concluding that an individual female faculty member
was a victim of discrimination was to assume that she was if she was paid a salary less than the
formula salary.
173. Id. at 182.
174. Id. at 183.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (unlawful employment practice for an employer "to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way ... because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
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V. COMPARABLE WORTH PLANS AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Equal Protection Standards Governing Voluntary
Affirmative Action Plans
As described below, the constitutional standard applied to voluntary
affirmative action programs for public employers is a more stringent
standard than under Title VII. Thus, it is more difficult for a public-
sector employer to adopt an affirmative action plan without violating the
equal protection clause than it is for it to adopt a plan consistent with
Title VII.1 6
The only Supreme Court case dealing with voluntary affirmative ac-
tion in employment that has been decided on equal protection
grounds 7' is Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.78  Wygant ad-
dressed a challenge to a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement
governing public school teachers, requiring that, in the event of layoffs,
seniority be ignored if seniority-based layoffs would decrease the percent-
age of minority teachers.1 79 The purpose of the provision was to prevent
the last-hired/first-fired principle from eroding the effects of the school
district's affirmative action plan dealing with hiring.180 In determining
whether the layoff provision violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, Justice Powell, writing for a four-member plural-
ity, employed the "strict scrutiny" test. 8 ' Under strict scrutiny, the pro-
vision must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest in
order to be constitutional.1 82
The plurality initially addressed whether the provision was adopted
176. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), stated:
"[W]e do not regard as identical the constraints of Title VII and the federal constitution on
voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans." Id. at 632.
177. Although Johnson involved a public employer, id. at 620 n.2, the plaintiff had not
raised a constitutional challenge to the affirmative action plan.
178. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
179. Id. at 270.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 274.
182. Id. It is unlikely that the same analysis would be applied to sex classifications, since
the standard generally applied to sex classifications is "heightened scrutiny," rather than
"strict scrutiny." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). This could mean that sex-
based affirmative action will be easier to justify than race-based affirmative action, which
would be ironic since the justification for the application of strict scrutiny to racial classifica-
tions is the long history of discrimination against blacks. One would not think that the greater
wrong would be more difficult to remedy.
Ultimately, it may not matter whether heightened or intermediate scrutiny is applied to
sex-based classifications because the result is likely to be the same under either form of scru-
tiny. That is, to the extent that strict scrutiny is applied to racial classifications because of the
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to further a compelling governmental interest, 183 rejecting several argu-
ments raised by the Board of Education. First, the Board had suggested
that the provision was warranted to remedy societal discrimination
84
similar to the kind involved in Johnson v. Transportation Agency. 18 The
plurality stated that such a showing did not satisfy a compelling govern-
mental interest.'86 Rather, the school district needed to show that it had
engaged in prior discrimination, because "[iln the absence of particular-
ized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their
reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future."'
1 87
Second, the plurality rejected the Board's argument that the benefi-
cial effects of having minority teachers as role models for minority stu-
dents justified the provision.' 8 According to Justice Powell, the role-
model theory did not properly limit affirmative action to remedying the
effects of prior discrimination since it required a "year-to-year calibra-
tion" to adjust to the percentage of minority students.'
89
Finally, Justice Powell rejected the Board's claim that the affirma-
tive action provision was enacted as a response to its own prior discrimi-
nation against blacks.' 90 He stated that before a public employer
embarks on an affirmative action plan, it must have "convincing evidence
that remedial action is warranted."'' He concluded that the Board did
not explain why its affirmative action plan included Orientals, American
Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, since there was no evidence of
prior purposeful discrimination against members of these groups.
192
The Court's recent decision in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co. 193 relied heavily on the plurality opinion in Wygant. JA. Croson in-
volved a challenge to a city ordinance requiring all prime contractors
awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent
of the dollar amount of each contract to "Minority Business Enterprises"
anywhere in the country.' 94 In striking down the ordinance, a majority
history of egregious wrongs against blacks, the state interest in remedying racial discrimination
will be more compelling than in cases seeking to remedy sex-based discrimination.
183. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
184. Id.
185. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627-30.
186. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 275.
190. Id. at 277.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 284 n.13.
193. 57 U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1989) (No. 87-998).
194. Id. at 4134.
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of the Court for the first time held that strict scrutiny applies to all gov-
ernment racial classifications irrespective of "the race of those burdened
or benefited by a particular classification.""19 Applying strict scrutiny to
the ordinance, the Court concluded that it was not supported by a com-
pelling interest, because it was designed to remedy "past discrimination
in the construction industry" in general, rather than discrimination in
the city of Richmond. 196 The Court found further support for its conclu-
sion in the inclusion of minorities other than blacks, such as Eskimos and
Aleuts, despite the fact that "[i]t may well be that Richmond has never
had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen."19 The Court concluded that "[t]he
gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference strongly im-
pugns the city's claim of remedial motivation." 198
In sum, before a public-sector employer may adopt an affirmative
action plan, it must have "convincing evidence that remedial action is
warranted."1 99 Although the Court has not yet determined the amount
of evidence that will be needed to make such a showing, Justice
O'Connor suggested in her Wygant concurrence that evidence sufficient
to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination would satisfy the
requirement.2°
After determining that the Board in Wygant failed to establish the
requisite compelling interest, the Court next examined the means em-
ployed.20 1 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, stated that even if the Board on remand could demonstrate
prior discrimination and thereby establish a compelling governmental in-
terest in support of its plan, it could not show that the means were nar-
rowly tailored to remedy that discrimination.202 Justice Powell relied
primarily on the unnecessary-trammeling analysis of United Steelworkers
of,4merica v. Weber203 to reach this conclusion.20 4
Although Justice Powell acknowledged that it is sometimes neces-
sary to take race into account when remedying the effects of prior dis-
crimination,2 °0 he viewed the layoff provisions as substantially different
195. Id. at 4139; see id. at 4146 (Scalia, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 4140.
197. Id. at 4142.
198. Id.
199. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284.
200. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 279-84. The Court addressed this issue to avoid a determination on remand
whether the Board had engaged in prior discrimination. Id. at 278.
202. Id. at 283.
203. 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
204. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282 n.9.
205. Id. at 280.
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from hiring goals.206 Hiring goals, he stated, often foreclose only one of
several opportunities, while layoffs impose the entire burden on particu-
lar individuals.2 7 Furthermore, modifying a seniority-based layoff sys-
tem disrupts "settled expectations in a way that hiring goals do not. ' 20 8
Justice Powell concluded that less intrusive, yet equally effective means,
such as hiring goals, were available to the Board to achieve its asserted
goal.
209
Although Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion conclud-
ing that no compelling interest justified the layoff provision, 210 she did
not adopt his analysis of the means employed to implement that inter-
est.211 In her view, since the layoff provision was tied to a hiring goal
that was based on the percentage of minority students and therefore un-
related to remedying discrimination, it was not narrowly tailored to
achieve a legitimate goal.2 12
The Court in JA. Croson again followed the lead of Wygant in as-
sessing the means by which the goal was intended to be achieved.213 The
Court first observed that it could not be said with confidence whether the
Richmond set-aside plan was "narrowly tailored to remedy prior dis-
crimination since it is not linked to identified discrimination in any
way.' ' 214 The Court then emphasized two facts that it found determina-
tive. First, no consideration was given by the city to the use of race-
206. Id. at 282.
207. Id. at 283. Justice Powell's view that hiring goals diffuse the burden of preferences
throughout society is not necessarily accurate. Awarding a minority a job through an affirma-
tive action plan denies a non-minority that same job simply because of race. We may pretend
that such action spreads the burden throughout non-minority society, but each non-minority
does not bear a proportional share of the burden. What allows us our illusion is that the
burdened non-minority is difficult to identify, and therefore difficult to empathize with; how-
ever, he or she is burdened nonetheless.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 283-84. This provides a less than satisfying alternative, however, since the
Board's reason for adopting the layoff plan was to ensure that the gains achieved through
hiring goals would not be wiped out through seniority-based layoffs. Thus, although hiring
goals may be less intrusive than layoff protection, under these circumstances, they were less
effective when measured against the goal of increasing the level of minority employment.
210. Id. at 285-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White, the fifth Justice voting against
the layoff provision, concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 295 (White, J., concurring). He
suggested that the layoff plan had the same effect as a requirement that whites be discharged
and blacks be hired until blacks constituted a suitable percentage of the work force. Id.
(White, J., concurring). He believed that such a plan would be invalid regardless of the legiti-
macy of hiring goals or quotas. Id. (White, J., concurring). Thus, the Court did not need to
address the constitutionality of the plan. Id. (White, J., concurring).
213. J.. A. Croson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4142.
214. Id.
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neutral means of increasing minority participation in city contracting.2 15
Second, the thirty percent quota was unrelated to any goal "except per-
haps outright racial balancing," since "[ilt rests upon the 'completely un-
realistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in
lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population. '216
Moreover, because Richmond's scheme created an absolute preference
for a successful black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere
in the country, it could not be said that the ordinance was narrowly tai-
lored to remedy the effects of past discrimination against blacks in
Richmond.217
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the "narrowly tai-
lored" analysis under the equal protection clause is similar to the "un-
necessary trammeling" and temporariness requirements of Weber 218 and
Johnson.219 However, what is only implicit under Title VII is made ex-
plicit in the equal protection analysis: sex-based preferences are justified
only when there is no way of furthering the same interest as effectively
without preferences.
B. Application of Equal Protection Standards to
Comparable Worth Plans
The most common justification for comparable worth plans-"soci-
etal discrimination"-is an inadequate justification for a sex preference
under the equal protection clause. Therefore, the question becomes
whether public-sector employers will be able to justify the implementa-
tion of comparable worth plans based upon their own prior discrimina-
tion, which requires employers to have "convincing evidence that
remedial action is warranted. ' 220  Under Weber and Johnson the
Supreme Court has adopted a broad definition of "remedy," allowing
"remedies" even in the absence of a wrong. The Court's equal protection
analysis, on the other hand, adopts a more traditional and restrictive defi-
nition, viewing "remedy" as a means to correct a wrong.221
Under the equal protection clause, an employer must show more
than the mere existence of sex-based wage differentials before implement-
ing a sex-based comparable worth plan, just as it must show more than a
215. Id.
216. Id. at 4143 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
217. Id.
218. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
219. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.
220. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
221. Id. at 274-76.
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statistical imbalance in its work force before implementing hiring prefer-
ences. In either case, it must show that its own prior wrongful conduct is
responsible for the perceived disparity.222 Except in rare cases, that re-
quirement raises an insurmountable hurdle to the creation of public-sec-
tor comparable worth plans.
Even if a public-sector employer could demonstrate its own prior
discrimination, it would still have to demonstrate that a sex-conscious
comparable worth plan was necessary to redress the compensation ineq-
uity, unless it limits the remedy to the victims of the prior discrimination.
As discussed above in connection with Title VII, it will be unlikely that
such a showing could be made.223
C. Sex-Neutral Plans Benefitting Women
This Article has argued that sex-conscious comparable worth plans
are invalid under both Title VII and the equal protection clause, in part
because sex-blind plans constitute a more narrowly tailored solution.
This is not to suggest, however, that Title VII or equal protection con-
cerns are not implicated by adoption of sex-neutral plans. A comparable
worth system that is neutral on its face but implemented because of bene-
ficial consequences for women, would be subject to scrutiny under the
disparate-treatment analysis of Title VII and the equal protection
clause.224
The manner of implementation of a sex-neutral plan may be deter-
minative of its validity. For example, a decision to conduct a pay study
and implement the results because of a belief that the existing compensa-
tion system was irrational or discriminatory would probably raise no se-
rious issues. However, suppose a number of job evaluations were
performed, and the employer consciously decided to use the evaluation
system that most benefited women simply because it had that result. Be-
cause sex would have been a consideration in adopting the plan, it would
be necessary to evaluate the plan under the Weber
22
' and Wygant 226
standards. Similarly, if an objective evaluation of jobs revealed dispari-
ties between the sexes, and the employer decided to alter the objective
222. See id. at 277-78.
223. See supra notes 148-175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "narrowly tai-
lored" requirement in Title VII cases.
224. Although facially neutral policies with disparate impact are not invalid under the
equal protection clause, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), policies that are
adopted at least in part because of their disparate impact-not merely in spite of their disparate
impact-may be invalid. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
225. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
226. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1987).
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evaluation to benefit one sex, as in the Ohio example discussed earlier,
227
that is no longer a sex-neutral plan and should also be subjected to closer
scrutiny.
228
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the requirements of Title VII and the equal protection
clause as they relate to voluntary aftirmative action plans are not identi-
cal, there is substantial overlap. Given that public-sector employers are
governed by Title VII in addition to the fourteenth amendment, all af-
firmative action plans and laws must at least satisfy the requirements of
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 229 and Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency.230 However, many comparable worth plans do not satisfy
these standards.231
The failure of most comparable worth plans to satisfy the require-
ments of Title VII and the equal protection clause, together with the
ready availability of a nondiscriminatory method of achieving the same
goal, raises the question of why proponents of comparable worth favor
sex-based comparable worth plans. The answer appears to be grounded
in pragmatic political considerations.
First, many people will accept without reservation a policy with the
goal of equality between the sexes or races. A comparable worth policy
not based upon sexual equality would lose much of its appeal. Although
many people might favor civil-service reform in the abstract, it does not
enjoy the same political cachet as sexual equality.
Second, a sex-neutral plan only eliminates discrimination; it does
not guarantee equality of result. If forced to choose, many people would
choose the principle of equality of result over the anti-discrimination
227. See supra text and accompanying notes 28-32 for a discussion of the Ohio plan.
228. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (upholding claim that
employer followed salary survey for male employees but not for female employees); Interna-
tional Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981) (deviation along sex-based lines from the results of
job evaluations violates Title VII).
229. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
230. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
231. It should be emphasized that some of the "wage gap" can be remedied under existing
law. For example, an employer who channels female employees into low-paying jobs violates
Title VII. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 626 (5th Cir. 1983). A
violation of Title VII also occurs when an employer intentionally compensates female-domi-
nated positions less than male-dominated positions simply because they are female positions.
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 178-80. Finally, an employer who, on the basis of sex, pays females less
than males for the same work violates the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
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principle, and would therefore prefer a sex-conscious plan to a sex-neu-
tral one.
Third, viewing undercompensated employees as victims of discrimi-
nation leads to the conclusion that the "victims" should be given a pay
increase to put them in their "rightful place" in the compensation struc-
ture. 32 Needless to say, the aggregate amount paid out in wages by em-
ployers would increase substantially,2 33 but no doubt that is a price that
many wage earners are willing to see paid. On the other hand, equality
could as easily be achieved by lowering the wages of those in higher pay-
ing jobs to the level of those in lower paying jobs, or by raising the pay of
those in lower paying jobs and decreasing the pay of those in higher pay-
ing jobs until they are equal. Then, of course, the desired equality would
cost something, and those in higher paying jobs who may favor increas-
ing other employees' wages may suddenly lose their fervor for equality.
Only when the cost is paid by a third party may they be willing to partici-
pate in a system of wage equality.
These considerations are no doubt a major reason that unions have
endorsed the concept of comparable worth, 3a since in many instances,
adoption of a comparable worth plan results in an overall increase in the
compensation of the bargaining unit. It is predictable that unions would
232. For example, the majority report of the California Comparable Worth Task Force has
recommended that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act be amended to require
implementation of comparable worth in both the private and public sectors, with the added
requirement that "[n]o job classes shall be downgraded or reduced in compensation in order to
accomplish the purposes of this act." TREIMAN & CHENG, supra note 21 at 13. The minority
report, on the other hand, while supporting the concept of "pay equity," states: "Since the
claim of proponents of comparable worth is that some jobs are undervalued relative to others,
it follows as a matter of logic that some jobs are overvalued relative to others." Id.
One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that it would violate Title VII for an
employer to freeze or reduce the wages of overpaid employees in implementing a comparable
worth plan, because to do so would constitute disparate treatment. Clauss, supra note 1, at 94.
See also Blumrosen, supra note 23, at 118 (it is appropriate, and perhaps required by Title VII,
to raise women's wages, not to lower men's). However, it is difficult to take such suggestions
seriously. An employer's decision to implement a sex-neutral comparable worth plan across
the board seems to be the antithesis of disparate treatment under Title VII.
233. It is not clear how great the increase in labor costs would be, but the argument that it
would not be a substantial amount is unpersuasive. If the amount is insubstantial, this would
indicate that women are not now underpaid by a large amount. Proponents of comparable
worth cannot have it both ways. If the violation is large, the remedy also will be large. See
also Johnson & Solon, supra note 131, at 206-07 (overall, implementation of comparable worth
law would negatively affect status of women in labor market, in large part because increase in
wages would result in reduced employment). One comparable worth advocate has suggested
that employers could offset the increased cost by reducing health care and other benefits.
Clauss, supra note 1, at 91.
234. See Levit & Mahoney, supra note 11, at 130-31 (encouraging union activity in compa-
rable worth area).
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look with less favor upon comparable worth plans that result in a re-
structuring of wage rates with the same overall level of compensation. In
that case, there would be happy members occupying the positions
targeted for a pay increase, but there would also be disgruntled members
whose wages would be decreased.
The debate over comparable worth has assumed that the only ques-
tion under Title VII and the equal protection clause is whether an em-
ployer's compensation system can be challenged under those laws as
being inconsistent with the principle of comparable worth. The debate
has also assumed that the decision to implement a voluntary comparable
worth system raises only political issues, not legal ones. Yet, as the fore-
going analysis indicates, sex-conscious comparable worth schemes can be
considered valid only in relatively few circumstances. The fundamental
question that advocates of comparable worth must now address is
whether alteration of market-based wage rates is desirable if comparable
worth cannot be used as a basis for distributing spoils on the basis of sex.
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